Buyer-seller watermarking protocols integrate multimedia watermarking and fingerprinting with cryptography, for copyright protection, piracy tracing, and privacy protection. We propose an efficient buyer-seller watermarking protocol based on dynamic group signatures and additive homomorphism, to provide all the required security properties, namely traceability, anonymity, unlinkability, dispute resolution, non-framing, and non-repudiation. Another distinct feature is the improvement of the protocol's utility, such that the double watermark insertion mechanism is avoided; the final quality of the distributed content is improved; the communication expansion ratio and computation complexity are reduced, comparing with conventional schemes.
INTRODUCTION
Today's fast growing information technology permits perfect duplication and cheap distribution for digital works. The problems associated with intellectual property protection have become important issues. In the realm of security, encryption and digital watermarking are recognized as promising techniques for copyright protection. Encryption is to prevent unauthorized access to a digital content. The limitation is that once the content is decrypted, it doesn't prevent illegal replications by an authorized user. Digital watermarking, complementing encryption techniques, provides provable copyright ownership by imperceptibly embedding the seller's information in the distributed content. Similarly, digital fingerprinting is to trace and identify copyright violators by embedding the buyer's information in the distributed content.
The literature of fingerprinting research can be categorized as fingerprinting for generic data, e.g. csecure fingerprinting code by Boneh et al. (Boneh and Shaw, 1995) , fingerprinting for multimedia data Trappe et al., 2003; Liu et al., 2005) , and fingerprinting protocols, e.g. the ones based on secure two-party computations (Pittzmann and Schunter, 1996; Pfitzmann and Waidner, 1997) or based on coin-based constructions (Pfitzmann and Sadeghi, 1999; Pfitzmann and Sadeghi, 2000; Camenisch, 2000) . The shortcoming of these fingerprinting schemes lies in the inefficiency of the implementations (Ju et al., 2002) . On the other hand, the literature can also be categorized as as symmetric schemes, asymmetric schemes, and anonymous schemes. In symmetric schemes (Blakley et al., 1985; Boneh and Shaw, 1995; Cox et al., 1997) , both the seller and the buyer know the watermark and the watermarked content. As a consequence, it is possible for a malicious seller to frame an innocent buyer, or for an accused buyer to repudiate the guilt. This customer's rights problem in symmetric schemes was first pointed out by Qiao and Nahrstedt (Qiao and Nahrstedt, 1998) , and the problem can be solved by asymmetric schemes (Pittzmann and Schunter, 1996; Pfitzmann and Waidner, 1997; Biehl and Meyer, 1997) , where only the buyer can obtain the exact watermarked or fingerprinted copy, and hence the buyer cannot claim that an pirated copy was originated from the seller. When a pirated copy is found, the seller is able to obtain a means to identify and prove the copyright violation to a trusted third party. Moreover, in order to provide the buyer's anonymity, anonymous schemes (Pfitzmann and Sadeghi, 1999; Pfitzmann and Sadeghi, 2000) further make use of a registration service to eliminate the need of exposing the buyer's identity to the seller.
A buyer-seller watermarking protocol combines encryption, digital watermarking, and fingerprinting, in order to ensure copyrights protection, privacy, and security for both the buyer and the seller simultaneously in e-commerce. A buyer-seller watermarking protocol should provide the following security properties (Jae-Gwi Choi, 2003; Goi et al., 2004) , as the strategic design principle: Traceability: A copyright violator should be able to be traced and identified. Non-framing: Nobody can accuse an honest buyer. Non-repudiation: A guilty buyer cannot deny his responsibility for a copyright violation caused by him. Dispute resolution: The copyright violator should be identified and adjudicated without him revealing his private information, e.g. private keys or watermark. Anonymity: A buyer's identity is undisclosed until he is judged to be guilty. Unlinkability: Nobody can determine whether the different watermarked contents are purchased by the same buyer or not.
In the literature of buyer-seller watermarking protocols, the first known asymmetric buyer-seller watermarking protocol was introduced by Memon and Wong (Memon and Wong, 2001 ) by applying privacy homomorphic cryptosystems, and it was extended by Ju et al. (Ju et al., 2002) . Since the introduction of the concept, several alternative designs have been proposed (Jae-Gwi Choi, 2003; Goi et al., 2004; Lei et al., 2004; Zhang et al., 2006; Ibrahim et al., 2007) . Choi et al. (Jae-Gwi Choi, 2003) pointed out the conspiracy problem in (Memon and Wong, 2001; Ju et al., 2002) , where a malicious seller can collude with an untrustworthy third party to fabricate piracy to frame an innocent buyer. Goi et al. (Goi et al., 2004) found the conspiracy problem couldn't be solved through commutative cryptosystems in (Jae-Gwi Choi, 2003) . Lei et al. (Lei et al., 2004) addressed the unbinding problem in (Memon and Wong, 2001; Ju et al., 2002; Jae-Gwi Choi, 2003; Goi et al., 2004) and provided a mechanism to bind a specific transaction of a digital content to a specific buyer, such that a malicious seller cannot transplant the watermark embedded in a digital content to another higher-priced content. Zhang et al. (Zhang et al., 2006) presented a scheme, derived from (Lei et al., 2004) , where no trusted third party (TTP) is required in the watermark generation phase and the conspiracy problem is solved. Unfortunately, we find the existence of dispute resolution problem: in (Zhang et al., 2006) , in order to resolve disputes the buyer is required to cooperate and reveal his secret key or his secret watermark to the judge or to the CA, which is unrealistic in real-life applications. Ibrahim et al. (Ibrahim et al., 2007) recently proposed a scheme claiming that all the above problems has been solved.
Our Contributions
We propose a new anonymous buyer-seller watermarking protocol to fulfill the design requirements. Different from the predecessors, our approach makes improvements on the following aspects: With group signatures and anonymous communication channel. The essential mechanism for traceability, anonymity and unlinkability is to deploy a group signature in the protocol's application layer. Besides, an anonymous communication channel enables both anonymous outgoing connections and anonymous hidden services. We assume that a public key infrastructure PKI is available, such that each party has a public and private key pair certified by the CA. The CA is trustworthy and maintains the link between the buyer's private key and identity. Support multi-transactions and dispute resolution. The buyer is only required to interact with the CA prior to transactions, and with the seller during multiple transactions, hence no third party is involved. A judge can recover the identity of an adjudicated guilty buyer without the buyer actively participating in the dispute resolution process. Avoid double watermark insertion.
Existing schemes all require double watermark insertions, and it has the drawback to cause a degradation of the final quality of the distributed contents, thus end up reducing their commercial value. When applied independently, the second watermark could confuse or discredit the authority of the first watermark, thus acting as an actual "ambiguity attack" (Frattolillo, 2007) . We avoid it by designing a composite watermark, which is composed of the buyer's secret watermark, the seller's secret watermark, and a transaction index. Not limited to linear watermark. The proposed protocol is not limited to linear or permutation tolerant watermarks. As long as privacy homomorphism is preserved, any types of watermarking schemes can be adopted.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Some cryptographic primitives are reviewed in Sect. 2. A generalized model of anonymous buyer-seller watermarking protocol is defined in Sect. 3. The proposed protocol is explained in in Sect. 4. An example of the proposed scheme is illustrated in Sect. 5. The security analysis is provided in Sect. 6. Sect. 7 provides a conclusion.
CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES

Privacy Homomorphism
A privacy homomorphism refers to a cryptosystem E which is homomorphic with respect to some binary operators M in the plaintext space M and C in the ciphertext space C , such that (Rivest et al., 1978) and the ElGamal cryptosystem (ElGamal, 1985) are multiplicative privacy homomorphism. In contrast to deterministic RSA, ElGamal is IND-CPA. The Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem (Goldwasser and Micali, 1982) , the Paillier cryptosystem (Paillier, 1999) , and Paillier's generalization the Damgård-Jurik cryptosystem (Jurik, 2001 ) are additive privacy homomorphism.
Group Signature
Group signatures (Chaum and van Heyst, 1991; Camenisch and Stadler, 1997) , enable group members, each with its own private signature key to produce signatures on behalf of the group. Group signature schemes can be either static or dynamic. Dynamic schemes allows to update group members with time, with the advantage that instead of assigning a high level of trust to a single group manager, the group manager is separated as an issuer and an opener. This provides more security with a lower level of trust. The security properties of group signatures are formally proved in (Bellare et al., 2003; Bellare et al., 2005) : Anonymity allows group members to create signatures anonymously, such that it is hard for an adversary, not in possession of the group manager's opening key to recover the identity of the signer. Traceability permits the signer's anonymity to be revoked by the group manager in case of misuse, and ensures that no colluded group members can create unverifiable signatures, or signatures that can't be traced back to some member of the coalition. Non-frameability requires that no adversary can produce a signature in the name of a user unless the latter indeed produced it.
Verifiable Encryption
Verifiable encryptions (Camenisch and Shoup, 2003) can prove that a plaintext satisfies certain properties without compromising the secrecy. The applications include escrow schemes (Young and Yung, 1998; Poupard and Stern, 2000) , group signature and identity escrow (Ateniese et al., 2000; Kilian and Petrank, 1998) , and digital payment with revocable anonymity (Frankel et al., 1996; Camenisch et al., 1996) . In the proposed protocol, a verifiable encryption is applied for key escrow of the buyer's private key.
MODEL OF ANONYMOUS BUYER-SELLER WATERMARKING PROTOCOLS
Let X 0 ∈ {0, 1} * be the cover data, X be the set of all watermarked copies of X 0 , and k be a security parameter as a common input for all algorithms. An anonymous buyer-seller watermarking protocol involves four parties: a seller Alice A that is the copyright holder, a buyer Bob B, a certificate authority CA that functions as a group manager, and a judge J that adjudicates lawsuits against the infringement of copyrights. The protocol consists of the following three subprotocols.
Reg-BRC:
The registration protocol consists of an algorithm Set-RC and a protocol Reg . Set-RC is a probabilistic key setup algorithm to generate group manager's public key gpk and private keys (ok, ik) of the CA. Reg is a probabilistic two-party protocol
between the CA and B. Their common input are B's identity B and gpk. The CA's secret input is (ok, ik). B's output is his private group signature key gsk B . The CA stores B's group certificate cert B and the buyer's identity B in a registration table as reg [B] .
WK-BS: A two-party protocol (WK-S,WK-B) between
A and B. Their common input is gpk. A's secret input are the cover data X 0 and a transaction number φ, and A's output is a transaction record in Table A . B's secret input is B's group signature key gsk B , and B's output is a watermarked copy X ∈ X.
Arb-SJRC:
A three-party protocol (Arb-S, Arb-J, Arb-RC ) among A, J , and the CA. A and J 's input are a pirated copy Y ∈ X, the cover data X 0 , and a record in Table A . The CA's input are (gpk, ok, ik) and the list of cert B 's in reg. The CA's output is the identity id of a guilty buyer with a proof τ. J verifies τ and provides A the output as id or an empty string ε in case of failure.
Note that the registration protocol Reg-BRC is required to be performed once in the setup-phase by the CA for each new buyer. The watermarking protocol WK-BS should be executed multiple times for multiple transactions between the buyer and the seller. The arbitration protocol Arb-SJRC is executed for dispute resolution.
PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we elaborate on the three subprotocols. We assume the CA is trustworthy and consists of a group key generator, an issuer for group member joining, and an opener for group signature opening. Note that the security of the protocol depends on the security of the underlying watermarking and cryptographic building blocks. Therefore, the watermarking scheme employed is required to be collusion resistant. In particular, no colluded parties can remove or tamper the watermarking scheme, and nobody is able to detect and delete the embedded watermark from a content without knowing the watermark. As an example, we choose to employ Bellare et al.'s dynamic group signature (Bellare et al., 2005) , and Camenisch et al.s verifiable encryption scheme (Camenisch and Damgard, 1998) for the key escrow of the buyers private key at the CA. For consistency, we assume the digital content is a still image, although the protocol can be applied to other data format such as audio or video. An example of the proposed protocol with an additive homomorphism and a watermarking scheme will be provided in Sec. 5. Notations are depicted in Table 1 .
Registration Protocol
The registration protocol performed between the buyer B and the CA is depicted in Fig.1 .
The CA executes the group-key generation algorithm GKg to produce the group public key gpk, the issuer key ik, and the opener key ok. Then B begins with the user-key generation algorithm UKg to obtain a public and private key pair (upk B , usk B ). [B] , and sig B can be used later by the opener to prove group opening claims. Otherwise, the issuer returns an empty string ε and the protocol halts. Upon receiving cert B , B generates Figure 1: The registration protocol Reg-BRC performed between the buyer B and the certificate authority CA.
Watermark Generation And Embedding Protocol
The protocol can be executed multiple times for multi-transactions between the seller A and the buyer B, as depicted in Fig.2 
A performs the watermark embedding in the encrypted domain by applying additive homomorphism.
Let E(·) denote E pk * B (·), we have:
Thereafter, A stores (φ, m, λ,W A ) in 
Identification And Arbitration Protocol
The identification and arbitration protocol, executed among the seller A, the judge J , and the CA, is depicted in Fig. 3 .
Once a pirated copy Y of X 0 is found, A extracts the watermark U from Y and retrieves the most significant bits of U as the index φ in order to search the Seller (A) Judge (J ) Certificate authority (CA) Figure 3 : The copyright violator identification and arbitration protocol Arb-SJRC performed among A, J , and the CA.
SCHEME EXAMPLE
In this section, we provide an example of the proposed protocol and employ the additive homomorphism of Damgård-Jurik cryptosystem (Jurik, 2001 ) and the watermarking scheme by Kuribayashi and Tanaka. (Kuribayashi and Tanaka, 2005) . Note that anti-collusion fingerprintings by Wu et al. Trappe et al., 2003; Liu et al., 2005) can be applied for the coding of watermark values, in order to prevent complete removal or tampering of the watermarking by colluded parties. In this section, we focus on the watermarking embedding and detection scheme, but we will not explain anti-collusion fingerprints further.
The probabilistic encryption function of Damgård-Jurik cryptosystem (Jurik, 2001 ) is
cyclic group of order n s , and H ∼ = Z * n . Choose an RSA modulus n = pq and s ∈ N. Choose λ = lcm(p − 1, q − 1); g ∈ Z * n s+1 such that g = (1 + n) j x mod n s+1 for gcd( j, n) = 1 and x ∈ H; d mod n ∈ Z * n and d ≡ 0 mod λ (using the Chinese Remainder Theorem). The public key is (n, g), the private key is d. Given a plaintext m ∈ Z n s , choose a random r ← R Z * n s+1 , and the ciphertext is c = g m r n s mod n s+1 .
In decryption, given a ciphertext c, first compute c d mod n s+1 = (1+n) jmd mod n s . Let L(b) = (b−1)/n, and jmd is obtained by applying a recursive version of Paillier's decryption scheme (Paillier, 1999 In order to adjust the embedding strength, a parameter q w is defined. The final quantization matrix Q is derived from Q according to:
To increase security, a few DCT coefficients in each block are chosen secretly for watermark embedding. Their indices are generated by a secure pseudorandom number generator according to a secret key. For each block, the candidate DCT coefficients are chosen from a limited low frequency band, as shown in Figure 4 . In the simulation, the low frequency band is from f 1 = 0.2 to f 2 = 0.6 (normalized frequency). The embedding method is modifying the least significant bit (LSB) of a DCT coefficient after quantization. Conventional LSB-based watermarking methods modify the LSB in such a way that if watermark bit is 1, then the LSB is made odd, otherwise even. This approach cannot be directly used here because the watermark is encrypted and thus unknown to the embedder. Instead, some modification is made, as proposed by (Kuribayashi and Tanaka, 2005) . A DCT coefficient is always quantized to the nearest even integer if it is chosen to embed one bit. To insert the watermark in the encrypted domain, we apply the additive homomorphism of (Jurik, 2001) 
In order to preserve the image quality, if the requantized DCT coefficient is larger than the original one, the watermark bit is subtracted from the quantized coefficient in the encrypted domain, otherwise it is added to the quantized coefficient. In order to increase robustness, the same watermark message is embedded repetitively for α times in the same image. After watermark detection, a majority voting is used to decide the watermark bit. Watermark detection is straightforward: each image block is transformed by DCT and then quantized; if the specified coefficient is even after quantization, the embedded bit is 0, otherwise it is 1.
Simulation is carried out to show the performance of this watermarking scheme. A 512 × 512 gray scale Lena image is used in the simulation, as shown in Figure 6 . Assuming that the watermark contains 200 random bits and α = 75, the peak signal to noise ratio (PSNR) is shown in Figure 5 for various embedding strength q w . The watermark embedded version for q w = 75 (PSNR=36.9 dB) is shown in Figure 7 . Each image block contains on average 15 watermark bits.
In order to examine the robustness of the watermark, JPEG compression and Gaussian noise addition are applied to the embedded image. For the embedding strengths of q w = 55, 65, 75, the bit error rates of the watermark after JPEG compression are plotted in Figure 8 ; the bit error rates for Gaussian noise are plotted in Figure 9 ; Figure 10 -12 present bit error rates after average filtering, gaussian filtering, and median filtering respectively. As the figures illustrated, this scheme is robust against JPEG compression and Gaussian filtering; besides, it can resist weak Gaussian noise and slight filtering by average or median method. 
SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the security of the proposed protocol and explain how it fulfills the design requirements. The soundness and completeness rely on the security and robustness of the underlying cryptographic and watermarking primitives. Traceability. Once a pirated copy is found, the protocol provide mechanisms for A to identity the related transaction record, and for J to arbitrate and trace the privacy violator. Therefore, B is able to stay anonymous until he is adjudicated to be guilty.
Non-framing (buyer's security
Unlinkability. Because of the unlinkability property introduced by the one-time key pair, the underlying group signature and the anonymous communication technique, given the purchase information, no one can relate two transactions to the same buyer.
Quality and complexity improvement. In the proposed scheme, only one composite watermark is required to be inserted, which reduces the computation complexity. Another obvious advantage over double watermark embedding schemes is to prevent content quality degradation and to improve robustness.
Moderate expansion ratio.
Early anonymous fingerprinting protocols (Pfitzmann and Waidner, 1997; Pfitzmann and Sadeghi, 1999; Pfitzmann and Sadeghi, 2000) employ a bit-commitment, which leads to an expansion ratio of at least 10 3 to achieve security, and are inefficient. (Kuribayashi and Tanaka, 2005) Therefore, a cryptosystem with a smaller expansion ratio, i.e., the ratio between the length of the ciphertext and the corresponding plaintext, is desirable to be applied in the protocol. Various DCRAbased homomorphic cryptosystems are evaluated according to the expansion ratio in Table 2 . The Damgård-Jurik cryptosystem has the smallest expansion ratio of (s + 1)/s, which can be close to 1 if s is sufficiently large. Note that the Paillier cryptosystem is the special case with s = 1. 
E : G →G
GG
Expansion ratio
Goldwasser-Micali (Goldwasser and Micali, 1982) {0, 1} Z * n lg(n) Benaloh (Benaloh, 1994) Z/rZ (Z/nZ) * lg(n)/lg(r) Naccache-Stern (Naccache and Stern, 1998) Z/rZ (Z/nZ) * lg(n)/lg(r) Okamoto-Uchiyama (Okamoto and Uchiyama, 1998) Z/pZ Z/p 2 qZ lg(p 2 q)/lg(p) > 2 Paillier (Paillier, 1999) Z n Z * n 2 lg(n 2 )/lg(n) = 2 Damgård-Jurik (Jurik, 2001) Z n s Z * n s+1
(s + 1)/s ≤ 2 (s ∈ N)
CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed a new anonymous buyer-seller watermarking protocol based on group signatures and additive homomorphism. One achievement of the proposed protocol is to fulfill all the required security properties. The protocol provides revokable anonymity such that a buyer can purchase digital contents anonymously but the buyer's anonymity can be revoked as soon as he is adjudicated guilty. On the other hand, transaction unlinkability is preserved, yet the seller can trace copyright violators with the help of a trusted authority. The buyer is only required to interact with the CA prior to transactions; with the seller during multiple transactions; and is not required to participate in the dispute resolution process. Therefore, the protocol design is relevant to real-life applications. Another improvement of our scheme is on utility. The double watermark insertion mechanism from conventional schemes is avoided, in order to improve the final quality of the product, to reduce the computation complexity, and to enhance the robustness of the underlying watermark. The protocol gives the flexibility to adopt all kinds of watermarking schemes, as long as privacy homomorphism is preserved. We showed how to apply additive homomorphism, such that an encrypted watermark can be embedded in an encrypted content by adapting the quantized frequency coefficients. Furthermore, we reduce the expansion ratio from 10 3 of the conventional schemes which apply secure two-party computation and bit-commitment, to 2 as the theoretical upper bound of the Damgård-Jurik cryptosystem, which is reasonable for cipher communication.
